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Comment: Southern Violence-Regional Problem
or National Nemesis?: Legal Attitudes Toward
Southern Homicide in Historical Perspective
Dennis R. Nolan*
In preparation for commenting on Richard Maxwell Brown's
Article, Southern Violence-Regional Problem or National
Nemesis?: Legal Attitudes Toward Southern Homicide in Historical
Perspective,I I read for the first time a number of Professor Brown's
earlier works, including his early study of the South Carolina Regulators, 2 his recent general book on American violence, 3 and his contributions to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence appointed by President Johnson in the wake of the
urban riots of the late 1960's.1 I came to appreciate the strengths of
his work, among them careful, painstaking research, voluminous
documentation, and interesting and convincing descriptions of past
eras.
I also noted certain flaws that appear with some frequency in
those works, most notably a failure to clarify concepts and a tendency toward unsupported extrapolations and somewhat hasty judgments. The latter problems seem to be due in part to the former-the amorphous nature of the concept of "violence" lends itself
to generalization. Without a limiting definition there is a danger
that every act of physical harm will be seen to relate to every other
such act although it would be impossible to prove actual ties. For
example, in his Strain of Violence Professor Brown indiscriminately
lumps together partisan warfare during the American revolution,
vigilante actions on the western frontier, racially motivated lynchings, and single and mass murders by deranged men such as Lee
Harvey Oswald, Charles Whitman, and Dean Allen Corll, claiming
that all these and more constitute "a part of our unacknowledged
(or underground) value structure."'
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. A.B., Georgetown University, 1967; J.D., Harvard University, 1970; M.A., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1974.
1. 32 VAND. L. REV. 225 (1979) [hereinafter referred to in text as Southern Violence].
2.
3.

R. BROWN, THE SourH CAROLINA REGULATORs (1963).

4.

Brown, Historical Patterns of Violence in America, in THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE

R. BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND
VIGILANTISM (1975) [hereinafter referred to as STRAIN OF VIOLENCE].

INAMERICA 45 (H. Graham & T. Gurr, eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited as HistoricalPatterns
of Violence]; Brown, The American Vigilante
AMERICA, supra, at 154.

D-adition, in

THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN

5. R. BROWN, supranote 3, at 36. Later in the same work Brown states that "a historical
trajectory of violence" may be drawn from the gunfights of frontier Texas to Lee Harvey
Oswald's assassination of John Kennedy. Id. at 286.
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In large part, however, this tendency toward unsupported extrapolations reflects the bias of a rather trendy liberalism. One of
Professor Brown's contributions to The History of Violence in
America, for instance, contains the suggestion that the looting and
arson of the riots of the 1960's were merely modern variations on the
protests against British policy in colonial Boston.' Even more strikingly, in his Strain of Violence Brown argues that the Vietnam War
was somehow attributable to the fact that Lyndon Johnson was
raised in "the violent tradition of central Texas."' Now, Professor
Brown is far too good an historian to make such assertions without
qualification. He knows, of course, that John Kennedy, not Lyndon
Johnson, sent the first combat troops to Vietnam, and to explain
this fact he cites a different regional tradition. Kennedy, he says,
was the product of the eastern interventionist tradition of Theodore
Roosevelt, John Hay, and Henry L. Stimson. Even this does not
suffice, for our commitment was initially made by Dwight Eisenhower of Kansas and was supported by Richard Nixon of California,
not to mention hundreds of congressmen and senators from every
state in the Union.
Perhaps one could cite other "strains of violence" to explain
these factors, but it should be clear that at this level of generality
the concept of violence does nothing to explain the Vietnam war or
anything else. The fashionable tendency to explain a failed national
commitment as the fault of one or two men influenced by the
archaic traditions of one or two regions of the country is not very
good history, even though it might be very good politics. To the
extent that Professor Brown follows this tendency, his work as an
historian suffers accordingly.
I have discussed Professor Brown's earlier work at this length
because it provides a sharp counterpoint to the instant Article. With
the exception of his continued failure to refine the loose concept of
"violence," Southern Violence does not suffer from those earlier
flaws. There are no grandiose extrapolations and no broad liberal
interpretations. But neither does this paper reflect the strengths of
his earlier writings. In contrast to Professor Brown's earlier work,
and especially in contrast to his scholarly study of the Regulator
movement,' the research in Southern Violence is sketchy and superficial, the documentation slight, and the evidence accepted without
serious analysis. Moreover, the descriptions of individuals and geo6.
7.
8.
9.

HistoricalPatternsof Violence, supra note 4, at 53.
See R. BROWN, supra note 3, at 287.
Id. at 288.
R. BROWN, supra note 2.
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graphical areas-perhaps the most enjoyable aspect of Strain of
Violence-are neither sufficiently detailed to be interesting nor sufficiently penetrating to be convincing.
Perhaps the greatest failing of Professor Brown's Article is its
lack of focus, a failing that is illustrated in the title itself. What is
"southern violence"-or, better, is there such a thing distinct from
northern, American, or human violence? We never learn the answer
to that obvious question from Professor Brown. He seems to accept
Raymond Gastil's hypothesis that American violence is largely a
function of "southernness," 10 even though Gastil's argument is
marked by an obvious cultural chauvinism and is statistically unsound." Apart from these factors, Gastil and Brown simply equate
"violence" with "homicide rates." Recent statistics show how misleading that equation is.
RATE OF CRIMES PER 100,000 POPULATION, 197612

Region

Total
Crime
Index

Violent
Crime' 3

Murder and
Non-Negligent
Homicide

United States
Northeast
North Central
South14
West

5,266.4
5,157.7
4,922.9
4,783.4
6,782.8

459.6
523.6
381.7
429.3
548.3

8.8
7.0
7.4
11.3
8.5

Is it accurate to term the South "violent?" Its total crime rate
is the lowest in the nation, and except for the north central region,
the South's violent crime rate is the lowest. Only in terms of homicide and non-negligent manslaughter is the southern crime rate
above the national average. Surely this definition of "violence" is
too limited, especially when one considers that most southern homicides occur in family or personal fights," because most people fear
10.

R. GAsTm, CULTun. REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 97-116 (1975).

11. See Loftin & Hill, Regional Subculture and Homicide: An Examination of the
Gastil-Hackney Thesis, 39 Am. Soc. REV. 714 (1974).
12.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNrrED STATES 1976, at 38-42 (FBI Uniform

Crime Reports 1977).
13. Violent crimes include murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Id.
at 42 n.2.

14. The FBI defines the South to include all the states of the Confederacy plus Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Oklahoma. Id. at 40, 42. This raises another
definitional problem with the Brown paper: just what does he mean by "southern?" The term
is used often and loosely, but the only extended discussion in the Article concerns just two
states, Alabama and Texas, and the last of these often resents the implication that it is
southern. Lyndon Johnson, for example, claimed throughout his political career that he was
a westerner, not a southerner.
15. Brown, supra note 1.
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violent crimes generally, not just murder at the hands of family or
friends. It also is too limited in another respect. This definition of
violence does not consider suicide, the other type of intentional
taking of human life. As Sheldon Hackney points out," there is an
inverse regional correlation between homicide and suicide
rates-the southerner may have more statistical reason than the
northerner to fear that his neighbor might kill him, but he has less
reason to fear himself. The point is that a careful scholar should not
use a general term like "southern violence" without some effort to
define his meaning and to show its relevance. Professor Brown unfortunately does neither.
The next part of the title, "Regional Problem or National
Nemesis?," is just as confusing. The question mark indicates that
the Article's objective is to decide which categorization is appropriate for "southern violence." The reader is faced with an initial semantic difficulty since "southern" already defines a particular regional form of "violence" and "southern violence" must, by definition, be a "regional problem." Beyond that, one finds absolutely no
discussion of the regional versus national issue until the final paragraph of the paper. The intervening discussion of Alabama and
Texas makes no effort to tie events in those states to any "national
nemesis," but Professor Brown abruptly propounds several startling
conclusions in the final paragraph. He states that certain "aspects
of our national history, such as frontier violence, racial conflict, and
individual slayings in defense of personal honor . . . have contrib-

uted to the sometimes legal legitimation of homicide in America;"
that these aspects have "converged with greatest impact in the
South;" and that southern violence therefore has been "both a regional problem and a salient contributor to the national nemesis of
violence."
Each of these points may be true, but they are not supported
in the text. We are not shown that those "aspects of our national
history" have contributed to the "sometimes legal legitimation of
homicide in America." (Incidentally, we are never told what "legal
legitimation" means, or how often "sometimes" is.) To the contrary,
half of Professor Brown's Article concerns the fact that such violence
was not accepted by the law in Alabama. We are never shown that
those aspects "converged with greatest impact in the South," although other readings might indicate that that is so. Finally, we are
never shown that peculiarly southern violence contributes anything
16. Hackney, Southern Violence, in THE HISTORy OF VIOLENCE
4, at 50-60.

IN AMERICA,

supra note
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to the "national nemesis" beyond its share of the statistics.
If this regional versus national dichotomy is not the theme of
the Article, what is? Several pages into the second part of the text
Professor Brown again raises our hopes of finding his objective. After
pointing out the obvious fact that even in the South most folks are
not violent, he says: "Thus a major theme is the confrontation between the law-abiding, peaceably disposed, on the one hand, and
the homicidal, on the other." But if this is the Article's theme, it
expires rather quickly. It is never directly mentioned again after
that statement, and even where it conveniently could be explored
in connection with Chief Justice George Washington Stone's campaign against defenses to murder charges, it is ignored.
There remains only a silent theme, one that begs to be introduced but never is. The last part of the Article's title indicates that
Brown will explore "Legal Attitudes Toward Southern Homicide in
Historical Perspective." With the exception of brief references to
Tennessee and Mississippi, he concentrates exclusively on legal attitudes in Alabama and Texas. These two states reveal a strong
contrast that clearly intrigues Professor Brown. The Alabama courts
restricted defenses to homicide charges in the late nineteenth century, while the Texas courts expanded them. The silent theme almost jumps out: what effect did these contrasting approaches have?
Did Alabama's approach reduce the number of such deaths or
Texas' increase them? Why or why not?
An earlier draft of this Article indicated that Professor Brown
believed there was indeed a causal connection between legal attitudes and homicide rates, but on further reflection he dropped this
point. The revised paper is content with an unsupported statement
that any relationship was "probably more effect than cause" because "the incidence of killing in Alabama seems to have been no
lower than elsewhere in the South." Nineteenth-century statistics
are unavailable, but the most recent statistics indicate that Alabama homicide rates indeed have been "no lower" than rates in the
rest of the South. In 1976, when the southern rate of homicide and
non-negligent manslaughter was 11.3 per 100,000 population and
the Texas rate was 12.2, the Alabama rate was 15.1, which made it
by far the most murderous state in the nation." Assuming that
similar evidence of the situation a hundred years ago could be
found, what does it show about the relationship between law and
murder? What does Brown mean when he says that the relationship
was "more effect than cause?" That the legal attitudes of the Ala17. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 40, 42.

256

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:251

bama Supreme Court were determined by the homicide rate? If so,
where is the evidence for it? Or are the attitudes the "cause" of the
homicide rate ("effect")? Again, what evidence supports that
assertion?
In short, if this relationship is in fact the theme of the Article,
it is never actually presented as such," it is never explored, and it
is ignored in the concluding section of the Article. It appears rather
as a failed hypothesis, submerged in the data because the facts did
not support it. That submersion, however, leaves the Article without any focus. The reader learns only that one Alabama Chief Justice opposed homicide a hundred years ago and that the law of
Texas at that time allowed victims of attack to stand their ground
and fight back. Neither statement is at all striking and each, in the
absence of any debate, might be dismissed as inconsequential. In
the further absence of any connection between the two statements,
the Article itself must be regarded as inconclusive.
Brief mention should be made of the evidence presented by
Professor Brown and the use he makes of it. Initially, consider the
recurring matter of unpunished murder. Brown makes much of this,
citing several early, if unscientific, commentators to the effect that
in the South those who committed unjustified murders for "selfrespect" were unlikely to be punished. The cases cited to illustrate
this statement hardly support that assertion. The first, Graingerv.
State,"' was the clearest case of self-defense that one can imagine,
and thus proves nothing about real murders going unpunished. The
defendant literally was chased by his attacker to a locked door and
had no further place to retreat. The reasonableness of his selfdefense was so clear that there was no reason for the court to comment upon it explicitly. If that decision was in fact misinterpreted
"throughout the South and Southwest" so that murderers went free,
Professor Brown should have no difficulty citing cases misapplying
the "Grainger doctrine." He does not do so, preferring instead to
trust the accuracy of a seventy-year-old secondary source.
The second case, Ex parte Wray," is seriously misinterpreted.
Brown asserts that the Mississippi Supreme Court "gave the mantle
18. A remnant of Brown's earlier position remains in his discussion of Grainger v. State,
13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 377 (1830). The court in that case reversed a conviction because the
defendant believed himself in danger. The opinion did not use the usual qualifying phrase
that the defendant thought himself so "upon sufficient grounds." This failure, Brown tells
us, inadvertently opened a "huge legal loophole" that allowed the guilty to go free in hundreds
of cases. He does not demonstrate, however, why this inadvertency should have had precedential force "throughout the South and Southwest," or whether it actually did.
19. 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 377 (1830).
20. 30 Miss. 673 (1856).
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of legality to killing in what it termed a 'personal and mutual recontre' " and "gave judicial approval to street-fight killing," resulting in a finding that the "obviously guilty" Wray was innocent of
murder. This is heady language, but the facts of the case and the
precise holding of the court give quite a different impression.
Wray sought-out schoolmaster Brown who had expelled Wray's
brother. Wray was armed with a knife and pistol, but before he
armed himself, he stated that "if he had a difficulty with Brown,
he would take a stick to him, and should the boys 'pitch in,' he
would use weapons to defend himself." 2 Wray struck Brown with
his fist when they met, and Brown pulled out a whip "loaded in one
end, with two and one-half ounces of lead, and struck Wray" repeatedly and rapidly over the head. Wray retreated some distance under
these blows and only then drew his knife and stabbed Brown.22 Wray
was charged with murder and appealed the denial of bail to the
Mississippi Supreme Court. Because bail could be denied only in
capital cases when the proof was evident or the presumption great,
the only issue before the court was whether the charge of murder
conceivably could be sustained on these facts. "It is neither required
nor proper, that we should intimate an opinion, either as to the
innocence of the accused, if we entertained it, or as to any decree of
manslaughter, of which he might be thought guilty."23 In keeping
with this limited issue, the court held that one essential element of
murder, express intent to kill, was lacking on these facts and therefore bail could not be denied. We are never told whether Wray
ultimately was found guilty or innocent of any other charges. Wray's
conduct certainly was reprehensible, and as the dissent indicated,?
the court's decision was arguable. But it cannot fairly be said that
Wray was "obviously guilty" of murder or that the court "gave
judicial approval to street-fight killing."
Furthermore, the Alabama cases discussed next implicitly reject Brown's statement about unpunished murders, because with
one exception each involved an affirmance of a lower court conviction for just the sort of crime for which Brown says perpetrators were
not punished in the South.2s The one exception, Judge v. State,2 8
21. Id. at 675.
22. Id. at 677.
23. Id. at 678.
24. Id. at 681 (Handy, J., dissenting).
25. See Johnson v. State, 102 Ala. 1, 16 So. 99 (1894) (conviction reversed on procedural
grounds after rehearing); Scales v. State, 96 Ala. 69, 11 So. 121 (1892); Cleveland v. State,
86 Ala. 1, 5 So. 426 (1889); Dolan v. State, 81 Ala. 11, 1 So. 707 (1887); Ingram v. State, 67
Ala. 67 (1880).
26. 58 Ala. 406 (1877).
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does lend some support to the belief that southern courts were
"soft" on murders arising out of personal quarrels. It undercuts
Professor Brown's interpretation of Chief Justice Stone's role, however, because in that case Stone reversed a first degree murder
conviction partly because the trial court too narrowly stated the
permissible grounds of self-defense.27 The Texas cases discussed last
do support Professor Brown's main proposition, but as a whole this
seems to be a strange pile of contradictory authority on which to rest
generalizations about unpunished southern murders.
There is the further problem of selectivity. Brown's discussion
of "southern violence" is restricted chiefly to Alabama and Texas
violence. The reader is never told why or whether these states epitomize the South. Is Texas indicative of anyplace beyond its borders?
If so, is it not a better example of western violence than southern?
By Brown's own statement Alabama was an exception not only to
the South but also to the Nation as a whole-Chief Justice Stone,
he informs us, fought a "courageous rear-guard action" against the
"Americanization of the common law of homicide." 2 What then
does that struggle indicate about "southern" violence?
Finally, consider the case of Texas. The reader learns that
Texas adopted a number of legal rules widening the plea of selfdefense. Among these were the "stand-one's-ground" principle,
which held that the victim of an attack need not retreat before using
deadly force in his defense, and the recognition of an individual's
right to kill in defense of personal property. These rules "reinforced
rather than restrained the homicidal tendency" of Texans.
What evidence is the reader given for these statements about
nineteenth-century Texas? The stand-one's-ground rule discussion
is particularly instructive. Brown states that the issue "is directly
relevant to the incidence of homicide in the South." Nothing in his
Article supports that assertion. Brown presents not a single statistic
connecting that rule with nineteenth-century homicide rates in
Texas, the South, or the Nation. The only statistic of any sort offered is irrelevant-a study of 268 Houston murders in 1969 simply
concludes that in many cases "both killers and victims could easily
have deescalated the seriousness of the situation by retreat."2 That
study says nothing at all about the situation in the rest of Texas or
27. Id. at 409.
28. Since Stone's decisions in this rear-guard action simply affirmed the decisions of
juries and lower court judges, the reader is entitled to wonder why the adjective "courageous"
is applied.
29. H. LUNDSGAARDE, MURDER IN SPACE CrrY: A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF HousToN HomiCIDE PArrERNs 164 (1977).
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the South a century ago. More importantly, it says nothing about
the impact, or lack thereof, of legal rules on human action. Do we
have any reason to believe that the sort of murders with which
Professor Brown is concerned-barroom brawls and family
feuds-normally are committed by persons who know the formal
law of Texas? And if such murderers are aware of the law, do we
have any reason to believe that they stop to think about it before
they pull the trigger or plunge the knife? More generally, if, as
Professor Brown admits, the rest of the Nation adopted similar selfdefense rules, why should Texas be such an unusually murderous
place?"
The preceding pages should indicate that Southern Violence is
a disappointment to those of us whose expectations had been raised
by Professor Brown's earlier works and to those who are interested
in his stated topic. It is a thoroughly unfocused, loose collection of
facts and incidents that will interest only those with a curiosity
about Alabama's Chief Justice Stone or the Texas law of selfdefense. The paper does contain several seeds of thought that might,
if given adequate attention, grow into testable hypotheses. Those
hypotheses will be hard to evaluate, but they are of immense importance because they concern the fundamental relationship between formal law and human action. I hope that Professor Brown
nurtures those seeds, and I trust that if he does, his harvest will be
up to the high standards he set in years past.
30. Chief Justice Stone, it will be recalled, fought a "courageous, rear-guard action,"
while the rest of the nation was "Americanizing" the common law of homicide. Neither is it
clear that Texas was so murderous. At least today Texas is far surpassed by Alabama, see
text accompanying note 17 supra, which did not adopt those rules, and we are given no
information about its relative standing in the last century.

